

第二章 Microeconomics HW2

(中级微观经济学作业 2)

Question 1

Consider a consumer with two goods. Let the price vector be $p = (p_1, p_2)$ and income be y . The indirect utility function is

$$v = \frac{y}{\frac{p_1}{\alpha} + \frac{p_2}{\beta}}$$

- (a) Derive the expenditure function.
- (b) Derive the Hicksian demand function.
- (c) Derive the Marshallian demand function.
- (d) For good 1, verify the Slutsky equation:

$$\frac{\partial x_1(p, y)}{\partial p_1} = \frac{\partial h_1(p, u)}{\partial p_1} - \frac{\partial x_1(p, y)}{\partial y} \cdot x_1(p, y)$$

- (e) Find the corresponding direct utility function.

【详细解答】

(a) 支出函数 (Expenditure function)

利用间接效用函数与支出函数的对偶关系： $v(p, e(p, u)) = u$ 。将 y 替换为 $e(p, u)$ ，令其等于 u ：

$$u = \frac{e(p, u)}{\frac{p_1}{\alpha} + \frac{p_2}{\beta}}$$

整理可得支出函数：

$$e(p, u) = u \left(\frac{p_1}{\alpha} + \frac{p_2}{\beta} \right)$$

(b) 希克斯需求函数 (Hicksian demand function)

根据谢泼德引理 (Shephard's Lemma), $h_i(p, u) = \frac{\partial e(p, u)}{\partial p_i}$:

$$h_1(p, u) = \frac{\partial e}{\partial p_1} = \frac{u}{\alpha}$$

$$h_2(p, u) = \frac{\partial e}{\partial p_2} = \frac{u}{\beta}$$

(c) 马歇尔需求函数 (Marshallian demand function)

根据罗伊恒等式 (Roy's Identity), $x_i(p, y) = -\frac{\partial v / \partial p_i}{\partial v / \partial y}$ 。已知:

$$\frac{\partial v}{\partial p_1} = -\frac{y/\alpha}{\left(\frac{p_1}{\alpha} + \frac{p_2}{\beta}\right)^2}, \quad \frac{\partial v}{\partial y} = \frac{1}{\frac{p_1}{\alpha} + \frac{p_2}{\beta}}$$

代入罗伊恒等式:

$$x_1(p, y) = -\frac{-\frac{y/\alpha}{\left(\frac{p_1}{\alpha} + \frac{p_2}{\beta}\right)^2}}{\frac{1}{\frac{p_1}{\alpha} + \frac{p_2}{\beta}}} = \frac{y/\alpha}{\frac{p_1}{\alpha} + \frac{p_2}{\beta}}$$

同理可得:

$$x_2(p, y) = \frac{y/\beta}{\frac{p_1}{\alpha} + \frac{p_2}{\beta}}$$

(d) 验证斯卢茨基方程 (Verify the Slutsky equation)

左边 (价格总效应):

$$\frac{\partial x_1}{\partial p_1} = \frac{\partial}{\partial p_1} \left[\frac{y/\alpha}{p_1/\alpha + p_2/\beta} \right] = -\frac{y/\alpha^2}{\left(\frac{p_1}{\alpha} + \frac{p_2}{\beta}\right)^2}$$

右边第一项 (替代效应): $\frac{\partial h_1}{\partial p_1} = \frac{\partial(u/\alpha)}{\partial p_1} = 0$ 。

右边第二项 (收入效应):

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial y} &= \frac{1/\alpha}{p_1/\alpha + p_2/\beta} \\ -\frac{\partial x_1}{\partial y} x_1 &= -\left(\frac{1/\alpha}{p_1/\alpha + p_2/\beta} \right) \left(\frac{y/\alpha}{p_1/\alpha + p_2/\beta} \right) = -\frac{y/\alpha^2}{\left(\frac{p_1}{\alpha} + \frac{p_2}{\beta}\right)^2} \end{aligned}$$

左边 = 右边, Slutsky 方程得证。

(e) 直接效用函数 (Direct utility function)

从支出函数 $e(p, u) = u \frac{p_1}{\alpha} + u \frac{p_2}{\beta}$ 可以看出, 支出在价格上是线性的。这意味着商品 1 和商品 2 在消费中必须按照严格的固定比例搭配。由希克斯需求 $x_1 = u/\alpha$ 和 $x_2 = u/\beta$ 可知, $u = \alpha x_1 = \beta x_2$ 。因此, 对应的直接效用函数是里昂惕夫型 (Leontief):

$$u(x_1, x_2) = \min\{\alpha x_1, \beta x_2\}$$

Question 2

Consider a risk-averse individual with wealth w but facing probability of losing D dollars. An insurance policy is available that pays money in the event of the loss, at a price of $\$q$ with certainty per $\$1$ of payout. Thus, if α units of insurance are bought, the wealth of the individual will be $w - \alpha q$ if there is no loss and $w - \alpha q - D + \alpha$ if the loss occurs.

- (a) Suppose $q = \pi$. What is the optimal value of α ? Which state will the individual prefer?
- (b) How does your answer change if $q > \pi$?
- (c) Suppose once again $q = \pi$. Now suppose that the individual has a chance to buy a report that will forecast whether the loss will occur. The report has a probability p of providing the correct answer and $(1 - p)$ of giving "no answer". Assume the insurance company has a rule that nobody can insure for more than D . Derive an expression for the sure payment V the individual would be willing to pay to purchase such a report.

【详细解答】

消费者的期望效用函数为：

$$EU(\alpha) = (1 - \pi)u(w - \alpha q) + \pi u(w - \alpha q - D + \alpha)$$

最大化 EU 对 α 求导，一阶条件 (FOC) 为：

$$-q(1 - \pi)u'(W_{NL}) + (1 - q)\pi u'(W_L) = 0 \implies \frac{u'(W_L)}{u'(W_{NL})} = \frac{q(1 - \pi)}{\pi(1 - q)}$$

其中 $W_{NL} = w - \alpha q$, $W_L = w - \alpha q - D + \alpha$ 。

(a) 当 $q = \pi$ (公平保费 **Fair Insurance**)：代入 FOC 可得 $\frac{u'(W_L)}{u'(W_{NL})} = 1 \implies u'(W_L) = u'(W_{NL})$ 。由于个体风险规避 ($u'' < 0$)，必有 $W_L = W_{NL}$ 。即： $w - \alpha\pi - D + \alpha = w - \alpha\pi \implies \alpha = D$ 。最优选择是全额保险 (**Full insurance**)。由于两种状态下财富完全相等，个体对“是否发生损失”完全无差异 (**Indifferent**)，不偏好任何一种状态。

(b) 当 $q > \pi$ (不公平保费 **Unfair Insurance**)：此时 $\frac{q}{1-q} > \frac{\pi}{1-\pi}$ ，代入 FOC 得到 $\frac{u'(W_L)}{u'(W_{NL})} > 1$ 。由于边际效用递减，这意味着 $W_L < W_{NL}$ 。即： $w - \alpha q - D + \alpha < w - \alpha q \implies \alpha < D$ 。此时最优选择变为部分保险 (**Partial insurance**)。个体更偏好“不发生损失”的状态。

(c) 预测报告的价值：如果没有报告，由于 $q = \pi$ ，个体购买 $\alpha = D$ ，期望效用为 $EU_{no_report} = u(w - \pi D)$ 。

如果有报告并支付了确定的费用 V ：

- 概率 $p\pi$ ：报告正确预测“会发生损失”。个体知道必发生损失，希望买尽量多的保险。受限于最高保额，买 $\alpha = D$ 。最终财富 $= w - \pi D - D + D - V = w - \pi D - V$ 。
- 概率 $p(1 - \pi)$ ：报告正确预测“不会发生损失”。个体完全不买保险 ($\alpha = 0$)。最终财富 $= w - V$ 。
- 概率 $1 - p$ ：报告给出“没有答案”。个体面临与原先相同的概率 π ，因此依然购买全额保险 $\alpha = D$ 。最终财富 $= w - \pi D - V$ 。

购买报告的期望效用为：

$$EU_{report} = p\pi \cdot u(w - \pi D - V) + p(1 - \pi) \cdot u(w - V) + (1 - p) \cdot u(w - \pi D - V)$$

合并同类项得到：

$$EU_{report} = p(1 - \pi)u(w - V) + (1 - p + p\pi)u(w - \pi D - V)$$

意愿支付的最高费用 V 必须满足 $EU_{report} = EU_{no_report}$ ，因此隐式表达式为：

$$p(1 - \pi)u(w - V) + (1 - p + p\pi)u(w - \pi D - V) = u(w - \pi D)$$

Question 3

A firm has production function $f(z_1, z_2) = z_1^{1/2}(z_2 - 1)^{1/2}$. The prices of the inputs are r_1 and r_2 .

- Find MP_1 , MP_2 , and MRTS.
- If z_2 is fixed at 5, what is the short-run cost function? Find the short-run marginal cost and average cost.
- What are the long-run input demand functions? What is the long-run cost function? Find the long-run marginal cost and average cost.
- Does the production function exhibit increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale.

【详细解答】

(a) 边际产量与边际技术替代率:

$$MP_1 = \frac{\partial f}{\partial z_1} = \frac{1}{2} z_1^{-1/2} (z_2 - 1)^{1/2}$$

$$MP_2 = \frac{\partial f}{\partial z_2} = \frac{1}{2} z_1^{1/2} (z_2 - 1)^{-1/2}$$

$$MRTS = \frac{MP_1}{MP_2} = \frac{z_2 - 1}{z_1}$$

(b) 短期成本函数 ($z_2 = 5$): 产量 $q = z_1^{1/2}(5 - 1)^{1/2} = 2z_1^{1/2} \implies z_1 = \frac{q^2}{4}$ 。短期总成本: $SRTC(q) = r_1 z_1 + r_2 z_2 = \frac{r_1 q^2}{4} + 5r_2$ 。短期边际成本: $SRMC = \frac{\partial SRTC}{\partial q} = \frac{r_1 q}{2}$ 。短期平均成本: $SRAC = \frac{SRTC}{q} = \frac{r_1 q}{4} + \frac{5r_2}{q}$ 。(c) 长期成本与投入需求: 成本最小化一阶条件: $MRTS = \frac{r_1}{r_2} \implies \frac{z_2 - 1}{z_1} = \frac{r_1}{r_2} \implies z_1 = \frac{r_2}{r_1} (z_2 - 1)$ 。代入生产函数:

$$q = \left[\frac{r_2}{r_1} (z_2 - 1)^2 \right]^{1/2} = \left(\frac{r_2}{r_1} \right)^{1/2} (z_2 - 1)$$

解得长期投入需求函数:

$$z_2(q, r) = q \sqrt{\frac{r_1}{r_2}} + 1, \quad z_1(q, r) = q \sqrt{\frac{r_2}{r_1}}$$

长期总成本:

$$LRTC(q) = r_1 z_1 + r_2 z_2 = r_1 q \sqrt{\frac{r_2}{r_1}} + r_2 \left(q \sqrt{\frac{r_1}{r_2}} + 1 \right) = 2q \sqrt{r_1 r_2} + r_2$$

长期边际成本: $LRMC = \frac{\partial LRTC}{\partial q} = 2\sqrt{r_1 r_2}$ 。长期平均成本: $LRAC = \frac{LRTC}{q} = 2\sqrt{r_1 r_2} + \frac{r_2}{q}$ 。(d) 规模报酬 (Returns to Scale): 设比例因子 $t > 1$:

$$f(tz_1, tz_2) = (tz_1)^{1/2} (tz_2 - 1)^{1/2} = tz_1^{1/2} \left(z_2 - \frac{1}{t} \right)^{1/2}$$

由于 $t > 1$, 则 $\frac{1}{t} < 1$, 所以 $z_2 - \frac{1}{t} > z_2 - 1$ 。因此: $f(tz_1, tz_2) > t \cdot z_1^{1/2} (z_2 - 1)^{1/2} = t \cdot f(z_1, z_2)$ 。这表明生产函数具有规模报酬递增 (Increasing returns to scale)。*(注: 从 $LRAC$ 随产量 q 增加而单调递减也能直接判断出规模报酬递增。)*

Question 4

The value of non-market goods. Consider a farmer whose production function is $y = f(x, q)$, where x is a vector of market inputs and q is a non-market quality variable (e.g. soil fertility, air quality). The price of output is fixed at p and the prices of the market inputs are w .

- Derive a simple expression for the marginal profit of the non-market good q .
- Derive an alternative expression for the value of q based on a market input serving as a substitute for q (Hint: the expression here should be related to MRTS).
- What is the economic interpretation for your results in part (b)?

【详细解答】

(a) 非市场物品的边际利润表达式：农民的利润最大化问题为： $\pi(p, w, q) = \max_x \{pf(x, q) - wx\}$ 。根据包络定理 (Envelope Theorem)，利润函数对参数 q 的导数等于目标函数对其偏导：

$$\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial q} = p \frac{\partial f(x^*, q)}{\partial q} = p \cdot MP_q$$

这表明，环境质量 q 的边际价值等于它直接增加的产量的市场价值。

(b) 基于市场替代投入的替代表达式：在利润最大化的一阶条件中，对任意市场投入 x_i ，有 $p \frac{\partial f}{\partial x_i} = w_i \implies p = \frac{w_i}{MP_{x_i}}$ 。将此代入 (a) 的结果中：

$$\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial q} = \left(\frac{w_i}{MP_{x_i}} \right) MP_q = w_i \left(\frac{MP_q}{MP_{x_i}} \right)$$

由于 $\frac{MP_q}{MP_{x_i}}$ 正是非市场物品 q 与市场投入 x_i 之间的边际技术替代率 (MRTS)，因此：

$$\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial q} = w_i \cdot MRTS_{q, x_i}$$

(c) 经济学直觉解释 (Economic interpretation)：公式 $\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial q} = w_i \cdot MRTS_{q, x_i}$ 体现了著名的“重置成本 / 替代成本 (Replacement Cost)”估值法。它的经济含义是：非市场环境商品 (如自然土壤肥力 q) 的价值，正好等于它所能节省的市场替代投入品的成本。例如，如果天然土壤肥力 q 提高了一点，农民在保持产量不变的情况下，可以少买一些人造化肥 (x_i)。那么，这部分天然肥力的“影子价格”，就正好等于农民由此省下的购买化肥的钱 ($w_i \times$ 节省的化肥数量)。